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Abstract 
 
 
This report describes work done in FY2003 under Advanced and Exploratory 
Studies funding for Advanced Weapons Controllers.  The contemporary 
requirements and envisioned missions for nuclear weapons are changing from the 
class of missions originally envisioned during development of the current 
stockpile.  Technology available today in electronics, computing, and software 
provides capabilities not practical or even possible 20 years ago.  This exploratory 
work looks at how Weapon Electrical Systems can be improved to accommodate 
new missions and new technologies while maintaining or improving existing 
standards in nuclear safety and reliability. 
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Introduction 
As part of Advanced and Exploratory Studies (A&ES) efforts funded in FY2003, 
Electronics Systems Center 2300 has been considering the topic of advanced weapons 
controllers to perform the surety function and the Arming, Fuzing, and Firing (AF&F) 
function for the next generation of nuclear weapons.  Although no “new” next-generation 
systems are currently being funded for development, Life Extension Programs (LEP’s) 
and feasibility studies for systems with extended or advanced capabilities not currently 
available in the stockpile are underway (B61 Phase 6.1 and Robust Nuclear Earth 
Penetrator – RNEP Phase 6.2).  This A&ES effort directly addresses the perceived 
“needs” statement below: 
 
The current generation of nuclear weapons is based on 20 year old (or 
older) technology.  They are not getting any younger, and the missions 
envisioned for them are changing.  Both of these factors are driving 
system engineers to contemplate how they might accommodate new 
technologies and new mission needs in the future while retaining or 
improving surety (safety, security, and reliability) 
 
The goal of this initial A&ES effort was to explore the fundamental issues of subsystem 
architectures and weapon enablement approaches, with an eye towards identifying 
configurations with high potential for use in next-generation weapons.  An important 
aspect of this was to identify approaches that would allow current weapon systems to be 
upgraded with the new architecture so as to allow future LEP’s to take advantage of 
changes in technology, as well as to allow wholly new systems (if/when they are 
developed) to be easily modified or upgraded throughout their lifetimes.  As a way of 
leveraging the A&ES effort in support of ongoing LEP’s and feasibility studies, this 
effort was primarily limited in scope to addressing architectures in terms of the known 
requirements imposed by that ongoing work.  We are working with the Robust Nuclear 
Earth Penetrator (RNEP) program, which is currently in the Phase 6.2 feasibility 
assessment stage.  Regardless of any specific program’s currently perceived needs, the 
team also tried to keep a forward-looking view with regard to weapon systems so that 
some anticipation of as-yet-unknown future requirements could be incorporated as well. 
 
Requirements 
The Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) Phase 6.2 feasibility study provided a fairly 
specific scenario that although currently only notional, acted as a direction for this A&ES 
effort.  The RNEP mission scenario illustrated in Figure 1 shows how the system would 
be deployed.  The most obvious new or different requirements that can be inferred from 
Figure 1 include the trajectory environment, the use of a guidance package, the impact 
loads, and the need for a post-impact Detonate/Destruct logic function. 
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Figure 1  RNEP Deployment 
 
The requirements inferred above indicate that the two current RNEP candidate baseline 
systems, namely the B83 and B61, will require some new capabilities and that implies the 
potential replacement and/or redesign of portions of the Weapon Electrical System 
(WES).   
Weapon System Design Issues 
The following issues become apparent when considering WES design/redesign tradeoffs 
and how any new/modified weapon system must still satisfy safety, security, and 
reliability requirements.  Again note that although RNEP played a role in focusing the 
discussion, it should not be assumed that the following list is all-inclusive beyond the 
RNEP scenario’s requirements. 
 
• Component Redesign vs. Reuse: (which components can and will be changed to 
use an internal weapons bus vs. which components will be retained from existing 
system design).   
o Specific existing components affected include: 
 Preflight Controller  
 Stronglinks 
 Firing Set 
 Inter-Connect Unit (ICU) 
 Programmer/Sequencer 
 Trajectory Sensing Signal Generator (TSSG) 
o Potential new components include 
 Inertial Measurment Unit 
 Global Positioning System Receiver 
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 Bomb Damage Indicator 
 Active Tail-Kit (Navigation, Guidance & Control) 
 Dual-bus Interface 
 Shock-Hardened Controller 
 
Although not addressed in FY03, the issues outlined below will be addressed in follow-
on A&ES work tentatively planned for FY04 and beyond.  The issues that have yet to be 
addressed in any detail but appear to be crucial to resolve early in any new WES 
component design efforts include the following: 
• Combining ICU/Programmer/TSSG functionality into a single unit 
o Security issues, if any 
o Electrical isolation (do stronglink signals and firing signals need to be 
isolated into separate components?) 
o Operational reliability (does this imply redundancy is needed?) 
• Hardened Controller 
o How to receive communication when other components may be destroyed 
by severe but expected environment? 
o Surety issues 
o Mechanical survivability 
• Implementing a completely new approach to weapon surety 
Component Redesign vs. Reuse 
Integrating new technologies and a new system architecture into an existing design is 
considerably more challenging than starting with a “clean slate”, primarily because the 
customer wants to minimize reengineering costs and sees reusing existing components as 
a way to achieve that.  It should be noted however, that reusing existing system 
components imposes constraints on the designer that may not exist at all in a new design 
and may in fact require more effort to accommodate than simply starting from scratch. 
 
As illustrated in Figure 2, the notional reuse of existing B83 or B61 components in an 
RNEP system does not eliminate the need to reengineer some components in order to 
provide all functionality RNEP requires.  Furthermore, keeping the existing point-to-
point system architecture makes further enhancements or modifications to this system 
highly problematic.  Adding new functionality (e.g., an optical seeker/sensor in the nose 
section) to the system illustrated in Figure 2 is not a straightforward matter and would 
likely require additional changes to components beyond simply adding the new device or 
subsystem.  One of the RNEP top-level requirements is that the system must be 
compatible with military carrier aircraft that provide only an all-digital “System 2” 
interface.  This begs the question of whether maintaining the older analog “System 1” 
internal architecture makes sense from either an engineering perspective or an economic 
one. 
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Figure 2  Reuse of Existing Components (yellow items require modification/replacement) 
 
In order to achieve operational performance objectives with regard to pinpoint targeting, 
RNEP will likely require some active Navigation, Guidance and Control (NG&C) 
element onboard that can modify the weapon’s trajectory in the terminal phase.  Thus the 
need for a “tailkit” (the NG&C package) and potentially one or more additional Inertial 
Measurement Units (IMU’s) as illustrated in Figure 2.  The additional functionality 
requirements that drive the system designer to add new system components like NG&C 
or IMU’s tend to make some level of redesign of the existing B83 or B61 WES 
inevitable.  Reuse of some existing components in that context will result in a hybrid 
weapon system with older technologies grafted into a more modern and flexible system 
architecture, with a vision of future upgrades being facilitated by a system architecture 
that inherently provides for modularity. 
Architecture Options 
The options available to implement an Advanced Weapon Electrical System (AWES) 
architecture can be decomposed into three basic categories; discrete point-to-point, serial 
data-bus, and hybrid.  The existing systems are point-to-point, discrete systems that are 
custom designed for one purpose only.  These are simplest to implement but have 
virtually no flexibility to be modified or enhanced over the lifetime of the system.  An 
alternative is a serial data-bus or -backbone configuration that relies on a network to 
communicate information between components connected to the backbone as illustrated 
in Figure 3 in notional form.  Serial data-bus architectures are somewhat more complex 
to implement than discrete point-to-point systems primarily due to data communications 
and throughput implementation issues, yet they provide considerable flexibility due to the 
modular nature of such systems.  Familiar examples of serial data-bus architectures 
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include (among others) Universal Serial Bus (USB), Controller Area Network (CAN), 
Ethernet, FireWire, and the MIL-STD-1553 military aircraft avionics bus.  Data is 
communicated between components using multiple-byte digital messages addressed to 
specific recipient(s) on the bus and transmitted as a formatted byte stream. 
 
 
Figure 3  Notional data-bus type architecture 
Because System 2 is essentially a data communication protocol that relies on the MIL-
STD-1553 communications bus hardware architecture common in all modern military 
aircraft, it made sense to consider how a new or modified weapon’s internal architecture 
might be configured to best make use of that.  Advantages afforded by the MIL-STD-
1553 communications data-bus that are relevant to weapon systems include: 
• Electrical isolation between nodes 
• Manchester data encoding 
• Data integrity (parity) checking 
• Command/response messaging 
• Megabit/sec throughput  
• Wide acceptance and use in military aircraft 
• High degree of modularity & flexibility 
 
Figure 4 shows a notional advanced WES that employs a modular approach via a MIL-
STD-1553 communications bus and is configured for the RNEP mission scenario.   The 
external interface to the carrier aircraft is System 2, and the data communications among 
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the weapon’s internal components is accomplished via a separate MIL-STD-1553 bus 
local to the weapon.  A dual-bus interface allows the two MIL-STD busses (one in the 
aircraft and one in the weapon) to operate together while the weapon is attached to the 
aircraft.  This is necessary because a MIL-STD-1553 bus must have one and only one 
(master) Bus Controller unit connected, and all of the other units present on the bus must 
be configured as (slave) Remote Terminals.  The dual-bus interface isolates the two 
busses when connected together so that they can still communicate in accordance with 
the MIL-STD-1553 standard, and allows them to remain independent so that they can 
both continue to operate as required after separation. 
 
Note that the system illustrated in Figure 4 shows one possible configuration, but not the 
only configuration possible or desirable.  The use of data-bus standards other than the 
MIL-STD-1553 for the internal WES bus is certainly feasible and should be examined in 
depth in the future.  The configuration of hybrid systems that make use of some bus-
connected components and some legacy (System 1) components is also a possibility that 
could lend itself to a phased approach in upgrading existing discrete point-to-point 
weapon systems to a serial data-bus architecture.  An exploratory System 2 hardware 
demonstration effort was conducted as a part of this A&ES work in FY03.
1
  Preliminary 
results from that work indicate that less than 0.3% of transmitted messages require 
retransmission due to errors, and that 8-bit microprocessors used in existing WES 
components (e.g., Intel 8031) were capable of handling the throughput, although 
switching to a 16-bit (or more) microprocessor would likely result in significantly 
reduced work-loading of the processor for the communications task. 
 
Figure 4  Notional modular WES architecture for RNEP 
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A major consideration in choosing a particular data-bus standard for implementation is 
bandwidth.  The data-bus must provide sufficient bandwidth to support the “worst-case” 
communications throughput anticipated for the system.  Normal operations for a nuclear 
weapon as they are currently configured for System 1 require very little bandwidth, since 
the number of information data “bits” is quite small (less than 1000) and the time 
available to transmit them is several seconds.  A weapon system with additional 
capabilities (e.g., an active guidance package or a seeker sensor-head) could conceivably 
require considerable bandwidth, on the order of megabits per second for imaging sensors 
like Laser Detection and Ranging (LADAR) units.  For the RNEP system, the NG&C 
system will generate position and velocity estimates and will make that data available 
over the data-bus to the weapon surety controller.  Estimating the bandwidth requirement 
for an NG&C unit is fairly straightforward and proceeds as follows: 
 
1. Estimate data stream configuration 
2. Estimate data update rate 
3. Calculate the data bit-rate or bandwidth 
 
The data stream should at a minimum include position information in 3 axes (latitude, 
longitude, elevation); orientation information provides little additional utility and is not 
required for surety purposes.  In order to obtain position resolution of at least 3 meters in 
latitude and longitude and 1 meter in elevation (over a maximum range of 30,000 
meters), the data packets must be 25 bits, 26 bits, and 15 bits long respectively.  This is a 
total of 66 bits of data.  Although velocity information is available from the NG&C 
system, high resolution velocity data is not required for the surety function.  If velocity 
information is required for some reason, it can be calculated from differences in 
successive positions over a measured time period by the surety controller and so is not 
required to be transmitted over the data-bus.  The data stream will require a certain 
amount of overhead to accommodate packetization of the data.  Assuming a “worst-case” 
packetization efficiency of 50% then the total data message must be (2*66) or 132 bits 
long including all data content, header, and trailer information. 
 
The data update rate occurs in two different contexts; internal to the NG&C unit for 
closed loop control, and external to the NG&C unit via the data bus for weapon surety 
purposes.  The internal rate will be much higher than the external rate, and it is only the 
external rate that is relevant to the question of data-bus bandwidth.  Assuming the surety 
controller needs to receive 256 successive position estimates to perform the surety 
function and the weapon is in flight for 20 seconds then the update rate would necessarily 
be 12.8 Hz.  This is not an unreasonable number and assumes a large number of data 
points and a short flight time to obtain a “worst-case” estimate. 
 
The resultant data throughput estimate for the data-bus is simply the number of bits per 
message times the number of messages per second, that is: (132 * 12.8) or approximately 
1690 bits per second.  The bit rate is directly related to the bandwidth in Hz since it 
typically takes a single bus voltage level “cycle” (rise and fall) to describe a single bit of 
information.  Therefore a bus bandwidth of 1.69 kHz is required to get all of the NG&C 
data transmitted at the required rate.  However, this is not sufficient because data bit-
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errors occur and if multiple transmitters are connected to the bus (as they usually are) 
data message collisions can occur that necessitate re-transmission of some messages.  A 
simple rule of thumb to accommodate bit errors and retransmission requirements is to 
avoid loading the data bus more than 50% of capacity.  This means that the true 
minimum bandwidth for the NG&C function is (2*1690) or 3.38 kHz, a value well below 
the 1 MHz capacity of the MIL-STD-1553 bus.  Although additional data messages will 
necessarily be communicated between the weapon surety controller and other WES 
components, those data rates will be similar to that currently employed in System 1 type 
weapons and will not significantly impact data-bus bandwidth. 
Summary 
In response to a perceived need for advancing the capabilities of nuclear weapon 
controllers to perform the surety and AF&F functions for the next generation of nuclear 
weapons, Electronics Systems Center 2300 has been conducting activities under A&ES 
funding.  Although specific requirements for particular future weapon systems do not 
currently exist, requirements for systems currently under study for feasibility (such as 
RNEP) provide a point of departure for identifying weapon system design issues such as 
“reuse vs. redesign” of major WES components.  Other important issues identified for 
future exploration include how functionality might be combined into a smaller number of 
major components to improve reliability, and how special/extreme environmental 
conditions can be expected to drive component design.  A notional architecture has been 
proposed to provide flexibility and modularity, both seen as being needed to facilitate 
future weapons systems designs and upgrades over their operational lifetimes.  Some 
limited experimental hardware work has been done that investigates implementation-
specific issues regarding the proposed architecture; the details of that work are contained 
elsewhere but referenced here. 
 
Further work in this area is recommended, including: 
• expand on notional architecture, flesh out details 
• investigate more powerful computation platforms, including the Sandia Secure 
Processor (SSP) system currently under development in Org 2100. 
• assess bus throughput/bandwidth requirements in greater detail 
• assess implications of new architecture on Nuclear Surety issues 
• investigate implications of extreme environmental conditions on hardware design 
• investigate redundancy vs. reliability issues 
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